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TORT LAW AND POWER: A POLICy-ORIENTED ANALYSIS 
Richard S. Miller· 
"[IJt is the greatest symbol of our 
democracy that the little person can 
take on the rich and powerful, and win." I 
I. INTRODUcnON 
The forty years since I was privileged to attend Tom Lambert's Torts 
class have not dimmed the memory of lessons learned. The very fIrst time 
I heard Tom speak was at a convocation at the beginning of the school 
year. I recollect a story about a small injured bird in the hands of a small 
boy; the lesson was that the bird' s life, a symbol for what is good, was in 
the boy's hands, just as the future was in our hands. 
It became evident, as the weeks passed, that Tom Lambert was an ex-
traordinary teacher and lecturer-a master of the English language-and 
that his obsession, probably annealed by his experience as a prosecutor in 
the Nuremberg trials, was justice. Justice, in Tom's view, did not seem to 
be just an abstract idea, but an ideal that became very evident in concrete 
situations, often illustrated as only he could by live instances of injustice. 
The most important example, I think, was not in a torts class at all but at 
an open lecture he gave, along with other intrepid members of the Boston 
University law faculty, in courageous response to a then-raging threat to 
our Bill of Rights, Joe McCarthy. Lest we had any doubts, Tom left us 
with a strengthened conviction that what McCarthy was doing was unfair, 
unjust, unAmerican, in violation of the Constitution, and just plain dirty 
and wrong. 
An example that leaps to my mind from Tom's Torts class, however, 
relates to recovery for negligently caused mental distress. I can recall with 
clarity the disdain heaped by Tom upon opinions that failed to recognize, 
in defIance of contemporary understanding, that emotional injury could be 
as serious as physical injury, that negligently inflicted mental injury de-
served redress, and that irrelevant distinctions-whether one suffered a 
meaningless impact or not, or feared for one's own safety or for the safety 
of a loved one~ught not to lead to differences in outcome. Justice re-
quired that the negligently harmed victim be compensated. 
Thus, I was lucky to have a front-row seat to the torts revolution, 
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whose generals, as varied in temperament and style as Civil War generals, 
included Roger Traynor in the courts, Fleming James and Tom Lambert in 
the halls of education, and Melvin Belli and F. Lee Bailey among the bar. 
Now, however, the hard-fought justice that was wrenched from the 
courts over the last thirty to forty years by the power of reason and con-
ceptions of fairness is much under attack.2 Indeed, the view that tort law 
serves corrective justice has all but been rejected as an important consider-
ation by the authors of a major study by the American Law Institute.3 The 
remaining major theory that tends to support the tort system, economic 
efficiency and deterrence is itself cast into doubt by critics.4 Indeed, one 
could get the impression, if one reads the recent scholarly literature on 
torts, that precious little by way of reason and philosophy supports the tort 
system. 
Of course, there have been critics (other than Tom Lambert) of the 
critics, and the last word has not been said on the ability of the tort sys-
tem to produce justice and deterrence.s I, however, suggest that there are 
other important goals served, or at least affected, by tort law that have not 
been given adequate attention; that not nearly enough has been done to 
examine and compare, with competing systems, the effects of the tort 
system on important values and on important value processes.6 The as-
sumption that the Law and Economics approach, along with the maximiza-
tion postulate-the notion that people always act to maximize their val-
ues-adequately takes into account all important values seems subject to 
considerable doubt. To be more specific, merely evaluating primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary accident costs and the law's effects in reducing such 
2. See generally PETER w. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUIlON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
(1988); STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DoING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION 
MEcHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS (1989). 
3. I A.L.I. REPoRTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBIUTY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 24-27, 441-
42 (1991) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY]. The authors state: "With respect to corrective 
justice, the tort system appears to perform reasonably well in the automobile accident context, but 
much less well with respect to medically caused injuries and environmentally related injuries. The cor-
rective justice appraisal of product-related litigation is unclear." Id. at 441-42; see Gary T. Schwartz, 
The A.L.I. Reporters' Study, in International Workshop, Beyond Compensation: Dealing with Accidents 
in the 21st Century, 15 U. HAw. L. REv. 529, 538-39 (1993) (discussing various tort law rationales) 
[hereinafter Beyond Compensation]. 
4. See generally John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 
85 MICH. L. REv. 1820 (1987) (discussing theoretical versus realistic interpretations of tort system). 
5. See generally Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. 
U. L. REv. 1637 (1993) (reviewing and criticizing Peter w. Huber's GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCI-
ENCE IN THE COURTROOM); Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. LJ. 649 (1990) (re-
viewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988»; 
Jerry J. Phillips, To Be or Not To Be: Reflections on Changing Our Tort System, 46 MD. L. REv. 55 
(1986) (discussing impact of tort system on field of insurance law). 
6. See generally Richard S. Miller, Revising the Torts Course, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 558 (1967) 
(expressing author's early views about policy analysis of tort law). 
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costs does not seem to take adequately into account tort law's impact, 
both positive and negative, on values other than well-being and wealth. 
It should be possible, however, systematically to examine tort law's 
effects on other values and value processes.7 It has been suggested, for 
example, that tort law may serve to educate or enlightenS with regard to 
how people in society should conduct themselves and as to what risks of 
injury they should avoid. A study of the educative effect of tort law, there-
fore, would seem to be a promising venture. In like manner, important 
questions about the impact of tort law on other values, such as skill, affec-
tion, and respect might also be raised. 
In this essay, however, I will discuss the effects of the tort law sys-
tem-more specifically the tort law applicable to accidents-on power. 
Like other values, power may be sought for its own sake or, more relevant 
to the theme here, as a means of achieving other important values. Be-
cause of the potential dimension and complexity of this inquiry, however, 
the reader will understand why this particular effort will only be prelimi-
nary and tentative, and why I make no claim to exhaust the subject. In 
conducting this study, appreciation must be given to the seminal work of 
Professors Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal,9 who, like Tom Lam-
bert, played an important role in my education as a lawyer and law teach-
er. 
II. DEFINING POWER IN THE TORTS CONTEXT 
The currently popular notion of "empowerment" captures, in a rough 
way, the concept of power that I will advance here. 1o More precision is 
needed, however. What is power? What kinds of power may be affected 
by tort law and how? 
7. See generally Richard S. Miller, An Analysis and Critique of the 1992 Changes to New Zea-
kuuJ Accident Compensation Scheme, in Symposium: Future Prospects for Compensation Systems, 52 
MD. L. REv. 1070 (1993) (examining effect of New Zealand's accident compensation system on vari-
ous values). 
8. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Ver-
dicts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1359 (1985). 
9. 1 HAROLD D. LASSWEll. & MyRFS S. MCDoUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: 
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POUCY (1992). 
10. By way of example, abolishing interspousal immunity may have empowered battered spouses 
against their abusive spouses, at least those with independent assets, by giving them leverage for a 
better property settlement in a no-fault divorce, by permitting them to bring a tort action against their 
spouse, and, hopefully, by deterring the abuse. The empowerment engendered by eliminating 
interspousal immunity was a significant factor, I believe, in the relatively recent repeal of Hawaii's 
interspousal tort immunity rule. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 572-28 (1994); see generally Richard S. Mill-
er, The Abolition of Interspousallmmunity--A Study 128 (1991) (unpublished, available University of 
Hawaii School of Law Library). 
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A. Power as the Ability to Affect Decisions 
For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to think of power as the 
ability to make or to affect decisions, II both formal and informal and of-
ficial and unofficial. I2 Thus, the broad question asks to what extent tort 
law enables accident victims to make or affect decisions significant to 
their own values or the values of others. 13 
With regard to personal injury tort law in general, the immediate goal 
of the exercise of decisional power is to recover compensation for an 
accident victim. A secondary goal may be to secure the adoption of law 
and policy that favors compensation and deterrence. The actual effects 
may be much broader, and on many other values. 
B. Decision-Making Functions of Powe';4 
While it is customary to think of formal power in terms of the institu-
tion that exercises it, such as judicial power, legislative power, administra-
tive power, or executive power, these distinctions are not very useful in 
identifying the specific forms or functions of power that tort law may 
produce or affect. Rather, it will be far more illuminating to recognize that 
there are several different power functions lS and then to ask which of 
these, if any, become accessible to victims of value deprivations, such as 
accident victims, by virtue of tort law. 16 The following is a description of 
these functions, along with some examples: 
The Prescribing Function-This function describes the making of law 
and policy. While we most often think of legislatures as the bodies spe-
11. See LAssWELL & McDoUGAL, supra note 9, at 399-452 (discussing concept of power). 
12. When we talk about power in relation to tort law and decisional functions, we are referring to 
decisional processes that are usually lawful-those that are both authoritative and controlling. See 
LASSWELL & McDoUGAL, supra note 9, at 399-400 (introducing concept of power). 
13. Lasswell and McDougal have identified principal values-things that people seek, including 
power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, and rectitude. LASSWELL & 
MCDoUGAL, supra note 9, at 375-556. When a value is sought for its own sake, it is called a scope 
value. When it is employed as a means of acquiring other values, it is a base value. LASSWELL & 
MCDoUGAL, supra note 9, at 340. Obviously, power may be sought for its own sake and as a means 
of acquiring other values. 
In the interspousal tort immunity example, the question would be whether the abused spouse's 
ability to bring a tort action against her spouse might affect decisions of a court, the abusing spouse's 
insurer, the abusing spouse, or the entire class of potentially abusing spouses. This might affect her 
own and others' values, such as well-being, wealth, respect or rectitude. See supra note 10 (discussing 
interspousal tort immunity). 
14. See generally LASSWELL & MCDoUGAL, supra note 9, at 161-67 (discussing intelligence, 
promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal as functions of authority). 
15. See LASSWELL & McDoUGAL, supra note 9, at 29 (explaining breakdown of authority func-
tions). 
16. See LASSWELL & McDoUGAL, supra note 9, at 399-400 (discussing power outcome). 
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cialized to the prescribing function, in the tort law context this function 
may also be seen in a case where a litigant seeks to create a new prece-
dent that favors, or for that matter disfavors, recovery of damages for a 
particular tort. That is, convincing an appellate court to recognize a new 
tort or a new tort rule involves the exercise of power in relation to the 
prescribing function. In this case, however, the appellate court, not the 
litigant, is doing the prescribing (the law making). 
The Intelligence Function-We have all heard the aphorism, "knowl-
edge is power." In the tort context, knowledge is all important. The ability 
to gather information, especially from an unwilling adversary, is at the 
heart of pretrial discovery, and is often essential to the success of the 
claim. Whoever disseminates information to a decisionmaker, such as a 
trial or appellate court or legislative body, is wielding a form of power, 
and whoever deprives an adversary of information that might help to influ-
ence a decision or who prevents an adversary from bringing information to 
a decisionmaker is exercising power. 
The Promoting or Recommending Function-Who has the decision-
maker's ear? Those who have the ability to have their recommendations 
delivered to and considered by a decisionmaker involved in making law or 
policy (prescribing) are exercising the promoting function. Once the 
decisionmaker, whether an arbitrator, trial court, jury, appellate court, or 
legislative committee, refuses (or simply fails) to listen, the counsel has 
lost the ability to promote (or recommend) the application or making of 
law and policy.17 
The Invoking Function-This is probably the most important power 
function provided to individuals by tort law. It is the ability to set a deci-
sional process in motion. Whoever has that ability has an important form 
of power. In the criminal law context it will normally be an act by the 
police, a prosecuting attorney, or a grand jury that may lead to the appli-
cation of the criminal law to particular conduct. In the tort process, how-
ever, it is the individual who claims to have suffered a deprivation, or 
more specifically, her lawyer, who ordinarily starts the process of claim, 
and possibly the judicial process, in motion. ls 
The Applying Function-This is, perhaps, the power function we most 
17. I recall observing an appellate argument in Michigan many years ago where the judges be-
came so unhappy with the argument of the attorney presenting oral argument that one turned her swiv-
el chair around so that her back was toward the attorney and most of the remaining judges left their 
seats and walked out of the courtroom. This was a graphic example of an attorney being denied the 
opportunity to further pursue the promoting or recommending function on behalf of his clienL 
18. For clarity, the performance of the invoking function in tort may be contrasted with the per-
formance of the invoking function in some administrative proceedings, such as NLRA and OSHA 
proceedings. In those cases, it is usually a labor union official and an OSHA inspector, respectively, 
who hold the power to invoke, rather than the affected individual employee. 
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often think of in relation to the jUdiciary. It involves the actual application 
of law and policy to a particular situation and the rendering of or the 
refusal to render a sanction, such as a judgment for damages, a fme, or a 
prison sentence. Normally, of course, we think of courts, particularly trial 
courts, as being specialized to the performance of the applying function; 
that is the power function that they are exercising when they decide cases. 
It should be noted, however, because roughly ninety-five percent of all 
civil cases are settled, that in those cases the application function is per-
formed by the person or entity that fmally decides to approve or reject the 
demand of an accident victim, ostensibly the defendant's lawyer or a 
claims adjuster. Furthermore, alternative dispute resolution methods, par-
ticularly arbitration, are often used to resolve tort claims. Obviously, how-
ever, the availability of a court to apply the law to particular facts and the 
development of law by appellate courts drives the settlement or ADR 
process. 
The Appraising Function-Who evaluates the efficacy of existing law 
and policy? Normally we think of committees of the legislature or law 
revision commissions as the formal appraisers. Appellate courts, however, 
are notorious appraisers of existing law, and lawyers and scholars who 
write journal articles and books and private interest groups who evaluate 
and criticize existing law are also engaged in exercising the form of power 
known as the appraising function. 
The Terminating Function-This function represents the converse of the 
prescribing function: putting an end to an existing law or policy. Of 
course, repealing a law does involve the exercise of policy-making, but it 
may be useful for purposes of discussion to distinguish the making of new 
law and policy, prescribing, from the repeal or rejection of existing law 
and policy, terminating. Again, we think of legislatures as the primary 
terminators or repealers, but we know that appellate courts also exercise 
that function. It is also important to recognize that unofficial but important 
decisionmakers, such as liability insurance companies, may also make 
decisions that effectively terminate existing legal policies. 
It is worth noting that these decision functions are necessarily interrelat-
ed. The ability to promote or to recommend plaintiff-favorable law and 
policy to an appellate court, for example, may depend on the plaintiff's 
ability to gather necessary information (intelligence) and to invoke the 
process of claim (to bring suit) that will lead to a trial court's application 
of law to the facts of the case and only then to an appeal in which law 
and policy are to be prescribed or terminated. 
Having identified the relevant power functions, the critical question is 
how, and to what extent, tort law creates opportunities for various actors, 
principally victims of accidents, injuries to property, defamation and other 
torts, to involve themselves in or meaningfully to affect these decision 
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functions. For the purposes of brevity, however, the discussion here is 
limited to participation in decision-making by victims of accidents. 
Before addressing that question, however, it is necessary to describe 
some guidelines by which to detennine whether a particular involvement 
or effect is to be viewed as positive or negative from a public policy per-
spective. It is thus necessary to clarify our policies as to the extent that we 
believe it appropriate for relevant actors, such as those who claim to be 
victims of tort, to play a role in the exercise of the power functions. 19 
m. CLARIFICA nON OF POLICY WITH REGARD TO 
POWER IN THE TORTS CONTEXT 
Wide sharing of lawful power among all citizens is seen as a sine qua 
non for human dignity in general, and, more specifically, as a condition of 
a democratic society.20 With regard to the conventional organs of power, 
granting the right to vote for the executive, the legislature, and in some 
states, the judiciary, is seen as the principal effective way to share power 
among all citizens. Nevertheless, there are situations where the right to 
vote may not be sufficient. These situations exist where decisions involv-
ing an individual's rights are being considered, or where public policy is 
being made by bodies to which elected representatives do not have au-
tomatic access. 
To be more specific, the right to vote coupled, perhaps, with the right 
to appear and testify before the legislature is a basic requirement of the 
democratic values of human dignity. But where an appellate court is 
seized with an opportunity to make law or policy, as they often are, and 
especially where an individual's rights and duties under the law are in 
question, the right to have voted for those who are appointed to a judicial 
or administrative tribunal does not suffice. In those situations, greater 
access to the decision-making arena is required to ensure fairness to the 
individual and perhaps to the group, such as accident victims, to which the 
individual belongs. With regard to fairness to the individual in specific 
cases, the federal and state constitutions of course provide for due process 
rights, including rights to exercise fonns of power within the tribunal 
charged with the decision. On the other hand, notwithstanding pennission 
occasionally granted to groups seeking to file amicus briefs, there are 
usually no express rights of particular non-party individuals or groups to 
intervene in appellate court proceedings or to participate in policy making 
19. LASSWELL & McDoUGAL, supra note 9, at 36. Other tasks elemental to effective policy anal-
ysis include describing past trends in decision, analyzing conditions that affect decision, projecting 
future trends, and inventing and evaluating policy alternatives. 1 LASSWELL & McDoUGAL, supra note 
9, at 36-38. 
20. See generally Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 9, at 737-45. 
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(the promotion and intelligence functions). Furthermore, there is no obliga-
tion on the government to furnish counsel to individuals, such as accident 
victims or alleged accident causers, who seek to prosecute or defend a 
civil claim based on law or policy. 
It is suggested, however, that a policy based on human dignity and 
democratic values should seek to provide wide opportunities for accident 
victims, and those who represent them, to participate in the performance 
of decisional functions, as described above, where their important values 
are or may be affected. 
Turning this rather abstract statement of preferred policy into concrete 
terms under today's conditions is not very difficult: In contemporary soci-
ety, the individual is often overwhelmed by the size, wealth, and power of 
impersonal organizations, both in the private and public sectors.21 Of par-
ticular, although not exclusive, concern are huge private corporations, 
often multinational in character, which may owe no particular allegiance to 
any nation-state or to any sub-grouping of individuals except perhaps to 
their own shareholders. In the accident context, those organizations are not 
limited to those who make products or conduct activities that may cause 
injuries to others, but also include those that provide insurance or reinsur-
ance protection to those who make such products or conduct such activi-
ties. Such organizations, because of their enormous wealth-and some-
times because of their ability to avoid accountability by seeking protection 
from friendly or sympathetic governmen~an bring to bear enormous 
power to influence the making and application of law and policy that 
favor their preferences. Both the current popular movement in the United 
States for lobbying and campaign spending reform and the failure of Con-
gress to achieve such reform are vivid examples of the extraordinary pow-
er of such entities to influence decision-making that relates to the making 
of law and policy affecting them. 
A preferred policy, therefore, is simply to provide accident vic-
tims-those individuals who have already become victims and the generic 
group of future accident victims-with countervailing decisional power 
sufficient to ensure fair and adequate consideration of their claims for 
compensation and for accident prevention and mitigation by those power-
ful and wealthy actors who cause accidents and their insurers.22 
21. See generally CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: PoWER AND REsPONSIBILITY (Warren J. Samuels 
& Arthur S. Miller eds .• 1987); Leslie Bender. Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, 
Mass Tons, Power, and Responsibilities. 1990 DUKE LJ. 848 (1990) (discussing ailments and advan-
tages of tort system); Allen Linden. Tort Law as Ombudsman. 51 CANADIAN B. REv. ISS (1973) 
(analyzing effects of tort law on society). 
22. The authors of the A.L.I.·s study refer to "[tJhe populist goal of tort litigation ... to empower 
the private citizen to act as an effective one-person lobby against ... abuses [of corpomte power]." 
ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY. supra note 3. at 26. With regard to accident law. this dmws the goal too 
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A situation of a somewhat different order, however, has been identified 
by many outspoken critics of the American tort system. They argue that 
accident law, particularly the law of products liability, provides too much 
power in the hands of accident victims to stifle useful and important activ-
ities, such as developing useful new drugs. Such overdeterrence, they 
argue, has adverse effects on many values, but particularly wealth and 
well-being. It should be noted that such overdeterrence, if it exists, may be 
caused as much by existing law and policy, including damage rules, per-
missible causes of action, and limited defenses, as by excessive decisional 
power in the hands of accident victims. The concern here, however, is an 
examination of decisional power. Thus, whether trial lawyers as a group 
wield excessive recommending power to dictate accident tort law and 
policy is relevant; whether a particular rule goes too far in favoring acci-
dent victims is not relevant unless it can be shown to be a product of 
excessive power to affect decisions. 
Another preferred policy, then, is to ensure that decisional power in the 
hands of accident victims-while adequate to protect their interests-is 
sufficiently balanced to avoid excessive and adverse effects on other im-
portant values. If these attempts at policy clarification seem somewhat 
vague and indeterminate, the antidote is to continue to clarify the preferred 
policy goals as particular power functions and particular situations are 
examined. 
It is appropriate now to examine each of the decision functions de-
scribed above to analyze the extent to which these goals are currently 
being achieved or might be refmed. 
IV. TRENDS OF DECISION AND DECISION-MAKING FuNCTIONS 
In discussing the access of accident victims or their advocates to the 
decisional functions, it will be useful to draw comparisons with legal 
systems other than our own. I will thus draw comparisons to the New 
Zealand accident compensation system, with which I am reasonably famil-
iar,23 to the Japanese civil law system, with which I have limited famil-
iarity,24 and occasionally to the English tort law system, about which I 
am largely dependent on the wisdom of others.25 Before addressing each 
narrowly. The purpose is to furnish the accident victim with sufficient power to gain redress against 
the powerful entity that caused the injury and to participate in decisional processes that will deter such 
accidents in the future. 
23. See generally Miller, supra note 7; Richard S. Miller, The Future of New Zealand's Accident 
Compensation Scheme, 11 U. HAw. L. REv. 1 (1989); Schwartz, supra note 3. 
24. See generally Richard S. Miller, Apples vs. Persimmons--Let's Stop Drawing Inappropriate 
Comparisons Between the Legal Professions in Japan and the United States, 17 VICfORlA U. WEL-
UNGTON L. REv. 201 (1987). 
25. See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured 
1078 SUFFOLK UNNERSI1Y LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVITI:I069 
of the seven decisional functions, however, a preliminary matter of critical 
importance that is very relevant to each of them deserves discussion: the 
availability of counsel. 
A. The Availability of Counsel 
Because individual accident victims seldom possess the skills of advo-
cacy and argument necessary to be effective either in pressing their claims 
for individual redress or in seeking changes in law and policy more favor-
able to their cause, access to or the existence of professional advocates is 
likely to be a critical factor in determining the extent to which victims 
possess or exercise decisional power. This question applies to all of the 
seven decisional functions discussed above. 
In the United States, of course, the legality of the contingent-fee ar-
rangement has been the single most important factor in ensuring that vic-
tims of serious accidents will be able to exercise decisional power effec-
tively.26 Plaintiffs' counsel, by reason of their effectiveness and the 
wealth they, or their organizations, have accumulated, represent their exist-
ing and future clients in virtually all phases of tort law decision-making.27 
For example, their ability as a group, until recently, to forestall congres-
sional efforts to place restrictions on products liability and medical mal-
practice is widely recognized.28 Not only do plaintiffs' counsel engage 
successfully in promoting their views of law and policy in Congress, but, 
at least until this year, they have been very effective in preventing plain-
tiff-favorable state law and policy from being terminated.29 Through their 
lobbying, they have thus engaged effectively in the intelligence function 
and promoting functions as they relate to prescribing and terminating.3O 
Their primary function is to represent victims in particular cases, and here, 
too, they are generally effective in invoking (initiating cases), promoting 
or recommending their clients' positions, and in providing client-favorable 
intelligence to the decisionmakers, be they arbitrators, courts, or insur-
Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567 (1993). 
26. See generally id. 
27. An example of such an organization is the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. 
28. See Joan Biskupic, To Discourage Lawsuits, House GOP Would Preempt State Laws, WASH. 
PoST, Dec. 15, 1994, § 1, at A25 (reviewing "Common Sense Legal Reform Act"); Peter Passell, 
McGovern vs. Nader, by Mail, on Changing Civil Justice System, N.Y. nMES, Dec. 16, 1994, at 21 
(discussing current issues concerning tort reform). 
29. In 1994, the General Aviation Revitalization Act, 49 U.S.C § 40101 (1994), was passed. This 
was the fIrst piece of federal legislation to impose limits on product liability suits. Ruth Gastel, The 
Liability System, INs. INFo. INST. REPs. (Nov. 1994). 
30. While plaintiffs' counsel participate in the same decisional functions at the state level, they 
have had considerably less success in preventing, prescribing, or terminating outcomes that restrict or 
limit victims' tort rights. See generally id.; Regulatory and Legal Developments; Tort Reform, DER 
(BNA) No. 123, at A-2 (June 29, 1987). 
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ers.31 
When one considers that future accident victims, who are happily not 
persona1ly identifiable in advance of the event, cannot themselves organize 
to lobby for favorable law and policy, and that there are few organizations 
that represent accident victims or their interests,32 the extent that victims 
exercise power through associations of plaintiffs' lawyers is impressive 
indeed. 
Whether victims' power is excessive is another question: Their access 
to decisiona1 fori has been almost unhampered, but it is clear that their 
success with regard to federal law33 has not necessarily been matched 
with regard to state law, where "tort reform" has been progressing 
apace.34 This fact, taken together with the combined resources of those 
organizations that seek to control or limit tort law, suggests, at least on 
preliminary view, that the power exercised by plaintiffs' tort lawyers in 
aid of victims' interests is probably not excessive or out of balance.3s 
Notwithstanding the favorable power position of tort victims achieved 
through legal representation based on the contingent fee, there are still 
some areas of considerable weakness, especially with regard to the appli-
cation of law and policy to particular cases. Thus, for example, the costs 
of litigation prevent victims of medica1 ma1practice who suffer relatively 
"minor" injury-such as damages worth less than $100,OOO--from retain-
ing attorneys on a contingent-fee basis/6 and the amount the system pro-
vides for such injuries makes it uneconomica1 for even an adventurous 
victim to pay an attorney to represent him or her on an hourly basis.37 
Further, not only are there few agencies, even legal aid societies, willing 
to accept such cases, but also, the one device that often provides holders 
of small claims access to decisional power, the class action, is ordinarily 
unavailable, for obvious reasons, to victims of medica1 malpractice. It is 
thus virtually impossible for such victims to invoke the process of claim to 
31. Having access to decision-making arenas, however, does not guarantee success. Indeed, the 
trend of trial outcomes seems to significantly favor defendants over claimants. See generally DEBORAH 
R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDs IN TORT LlTlGATlON, THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS (discussing 
trend of trial court decisions). 
32. Consumers Union and Public Citizen, groups associaied with Ralph Nader, are, perhaps, the 
most influential. 
33. That success has not always been unqualified. See generally Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (upholding punitive damages as constitutional, but suggesting potential for 
significant limits). 
34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing tort refonn). 
35. Examples include the American Tort Refonn Association, the Defense Research Institute, and 
the Insurance Infonnation Institute. 
36. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE 
LlTlGATlON, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 159 n.33 (1993). 
37. See PATRICA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE. AND PuBLIC POLICY 
196 (1985) (noting expense to plaintiff). 
1080 SUFFOLK UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVrn: 1069 
recover tort damages, let alone present evidence or promote a result favor-
able to them. Furthermore, such is the weakness of their position that there 
are virtually no advocates standing up for them; even those who urge that 
a no-fault system replace the tort system for medical malpractice recom-
mend that minor claims be allowed to rest where they fall or be handled 
by other systems.38 Such systems may not be adequate to deal even with 
economic losses suffered by such victims. In short, victims of minor medi-
cal malpractice are virtually powerless, in the sense that we have been 
discussing power. 
Another serious problem that has surfaced in the United States with 
regard to the ability of a tort victim to invoke the process of claim, not-
withstanding the contingent-fee system, is the ability of very powerful and 
wealthy defendants to so burden the court's performance of the applying 
function with costs as to discourage any legal representation under a con-
tingent-fee. The paradigm case is that of smoker Rose Cipollone, whose 
law fIrm, after succeeding, as no other fIrm had, in winning a favorable 
verdict in her case against a tobacco company, ultimately dropped her 
potentially favorable lawsuit and seven other suits against tobacco compa-
nies because the pursuit of such actions became excessively expensive.39 
Cases such as these may have the effect of causing lawyers to deny con-
tingent-fee arrangements to victims of alleged torts, especially toxic torts, 
committed by large and wealthy entities where novel legal theories may be 
needed or where diffIcult problems of proof of causation or discovery 
exist. 
It is also possible in the U.S. that impecunious victims of tortious acci-
dents may also fmd themselves powerless. Large damages, including pain 
and suffering and emotional distress, are usually built upon large econom-
ic losses. Poor accident victims suffer few actual economic losses, howev-
er, and may not seek or have access to effective counsel. On the other 
hand, the generally generous rules of general and punitive damages, the 
38. Cf. WEILER ET AL., supra note 36, at 101-03 (urging deductible period of at least two 
months). 
39. See Alison Frankel, Another Smoking Victim, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1993, at 60 (discussing 
Cipollone case). Frankel states: 
Combating what one Budd Lamer partner called 'a strategy of attrition' by the tobacco 
industry, the fIrm had laid out more than $500,000 in out-of-pocket expenses (not counting 
the cost of more than a million photocopies) and another $3.75 million in lawyer and para-
legal time. Depositions alone had consumed a total of four years of lawyer hours. After 
almost ten years Budd Lamer was sick of relentless motions, endless depositions, and foot-
long lists of expert witnesses. The fIrm foresaw no returns on its investment in smoker 
suits-only what one partner later called 'a bottomless pit' of litigation. 
/d.; see also Henry J. Reske, Cigarette Suit Dropped---Lawyer for Estate of Rose Cipollone Says liti-
gation Too Expensive, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1993) at 30 (discussing Cipollone case). But see Gary T. 
Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLmcs, AND CULTURE (Rob-
ert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993) (reviewing smoking litigation). 
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collateral source rule, the availability of the contingent-fee contract, as 
well as aggressive attorney advertising in areas with poor people, may in 
fact ensure that even they can gain adequate representation when they 
suffer tortious injury. That the tort system is regressive, in that it tends to 
benefit the wealthy more than it benefits the poor, is true, but it does not 
follow that the poor do not have access to the processes of invocation and 
claim when they suffer serious injury.40 
By contrast with the United States, nations such as Japan, which does 
not allow a fully contingent fee,41 and England and New Zealand, which 
prohibit the contingent fee altogether,42 tend to leave their citizens who 
suffer tortious injury relatively powerless to seek redress through the tort 
process-to invoke tort law and policy-except in limited situations. In 
Britain, where the accident victim must agree to pay his or her own legal 
fees and costs and may even have to pay the legal fees and costs of the 
opposing party if the claim fails, the only people who are likely to have 
the representation necessary to invoke the tort law are the poor or near-
poor who are represented by legal aid, workers who belong to unions 
willing to fmance tort actions for their members, and the wealthy willing 
to accept the risk to redress a wrong.43 While the losing party in Japan 
does not usually have to pay the legal fees and costs of the winner, there 
is a requirement that a part of the fee, based on a percentage of the 
amount of the claim, be paid in advance. This (together with court filing 
fees, which increase with the size of the claim) can be prohibitive if the 
claim is a large one. Other factors peculiar to the Japanese legal system, 
especially a shortage of bengoshi (trial lawyers), inhibit accident victims 
from retaining lawyers to invoke and prosecute their tort claims.44 
In New Zealand, which has substituted no-fault compensation for most 
aspects of the tort system, those who are injured have virtually no re-
40. Most unfottunate in the United States. however. is the posture of the accident victim who 
does not possess a colorable tort claim. As recent attempts to reform the health system suggest, the 
victims of non-tortious accidents do not benefit from the contingent-fee system. and are without repre-
sentation for their own claim. legal claim for benefits. or for law and policy changes that might benefit 
them. They appear. therefore. to be relatively powerless. except for the right to vote for elected offi-
cials who are or claim to be proponents of improved insurance or compensation. The examination of 
power in this situation is beyond the scope of this article. It should be recognized. however. that na-
tions with national health systems. such as New Zealand and Great Britain. and nations with a no-fault 
accident compensation plan. such as New Zealand. provide greater rights to such accident victims and 
a process of claim that the victim may invoke. usually without the necessity of counsel. 
41. See generally Miller. supra note 24 (discussing Japanese legal system). 
42. See R.D. MULHOLLAND, INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW ZEALAND LEGAL SYSTEM 100 (1990) 
(discussing payment of costs in New Zealand legal system); Vargo. supra note 25. at 1578-90 (dis-
cussing exceptions to American rule on attorney fee allocation). 
43. See 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABIUTY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
78 (1978) (stating "only 6.5% of accident injuries in England nowadays attract any tort damages"). 
44. See Miller. supra note 24. at 202-07 (discussing lack of bengoshi in Japan). 
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course, no ability to invoke a process of tort claim, against their injurers. 
Product manufacturers, governmental agencies, health care providers, and 
other wealthy and powerful tortfeasors are, for all practical purposes, 
immune from personal injury actions.4S This powerlessness may be as-
suaged to some extent in the case of an injured worker, because compen-
sation for work loss-eighty percent of lost earnings-is fairly generous. 
In the case of non-earners, however, who tum out more often than not to 
be women or young people not in the work force, compensation for lost 
earning capacity is low or nonexistent and the independence allow-
ance-forty dollars per week for one hundred percent disability, scaled 
down rapidly for lesser percentages of disability-is pathetically 10w.46 
They are virtually without power against their injurers,47 where there 
might otherwise have been a tort claim, or against their own governmental 
corporation, which administers the system.48 
45. Sadly, injured persons have little ability, because of the relatively high cost of legal represen-
tation and the risk of losing and having to pay winners costs, to pursue a no-fault compensation claim 
if it is rejected by the Government's claims manager. See Michele Crawshaw, ACC Or-
deal-Frightening Mum's Needle Horror-After Months of Pain and a Frustrating Battle with Bureau-
cracy, She Sadly Admits Defeat, N.Z. WOMAN'S DAY, Oct. 18, 1994, at 15-17 (relating much-publi-
cized case of woman who suffered serious and extremely painful injury). For instance, in one case, 
where a needle was left imbedded in the plaintiff's vagina during a gynecological operation, she was 
denied $2,000 payment for the curative operation because she could not secure approval from the 
Accident Compensation Corporation for the operation until after it had taken place. Id.; see generally 
Peter J. Trapski, Report of the Inquiry Into the Procedures of the Accident Compensation Corporation, 
Jan. 30, 1994 (on file with author). More recently, a Complaints Manager, whose duties are to hear 
and resolve such complaints, has been appointed by the government corporation that manages the acci-
dent compensation scheme. 
46. Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act, § 54 (I992). For example, those 
whose disability is 100 percent receive NZ $40 per week, while those with 90-99 percent disability 
receive only $31 per week. Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance (Independence Al-
lowance Assessment) Regulations, Second Schedule, Part II (I 993). 
47. See generally Greene v. Matheson, 3 N.z.L.R. 564 (1989) (discussing case). There, one of 
several women upon whom a physician experimented without their consent (the physician sought to 
determine whether cervical cancer would cure itself without treatment), brought suit against the physi-
cian for trespass, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent failure to obtain informed consent. Id. The 
court held that all of these claims arose out of personal injury by accident and could not be the subject 
of a suit. Id. Rather, the court held, the accident compensation scheme provided the appropriate rem-
edy for those who could not show significant eamings losses like most of the indigent women upon 
whom the physician experimented. Id. The scheme had very limited benefits, including medical care 
and a maximum award ($27,000 in the pre-1992 act) for non-economic losses. Conversely, a lawsuit is 
permitted to recover only exemplary damages if the defendant's conduct is proved to be sufficiently 
outrageous. See generally Auckland City Council v. Blundell, I N.Z.L.R. 734 (1986); Donselaar v. 
Donselaar, 1 N.z.L.R. 97 (1982); The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Allegations Concerning 
the Treatment of Cervical Cancer at the National Women's Hospital and into Other Related Matters 
(1988) (also known as the Cartwright Report). 
48. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing accident compensation system). An area 
in the New Zealand accident compensation system most adversely effected by problems of access is 
that of iatrogenic injuries. See generally Miller, supra note 7, at 1084-86 (reviewing new compensa-
tion scheme as requiring proof of medical negligence). 
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One way in which New Zealand has sought to counter the sense of 
powerlessness produced by the accident compensation system-applicable 
only to the context of medical injuries-is to strengthen the process 
whereby patients may invoke proceedings seeking disciplinary sanctions 
against medical professionals. Power in this context may be used to 
achieve rectitude-an official recognition that a wrong has been 
done-and perhaps to improve psychic well-being, but unfortunately not 
to improve physical well-being or to replace lost wealth. 
B. Tort Law's Effects on Power with Respect to 
Each of the Decisional Functions 
While recognizing that access to power for accident victims may be 
heavily dependent on access to legal representation, we may nevertheless 
fmd it useful to examine the extent to which tort law succeeds or fails to 
enhance victims' access to decisional power affecting their interests, legal 
representation aside. 
1. The Prescribing Function 
In the United States, it seems clear that tort law provides a vehicle for 
access by accident victims and those who represent them to proceedings in 
the most important arenas, legislatures and appellate courts, where tort law 
and policy are made. Until recent years, the primary arena for develop-
ment of tort law was the appellate court, and it is clear beyond doubt that 
the tort law revolution, which undermined traditional limitations on recov-
ery and developed new and sometimes controversial new bases of recov-
ery, took place in the appellate courtS.49 To a significant extent, Congress 
and the state legislatures have become the new arenas for considering 
decisions relating to tort law.50 But here, too, access for tort law victims 
through their representatives has been widely available. Arguably, the 
legislative halls have concentrated more heavily on terminating existing 
tort law and policy than on prescribing,51 but wide access is nevertheless 
available to representatives of tort victims. 
In New Zealand, by contrast, the accident compensation system has, 
subject to some recent interesting developments,52 removed personal inju-
49. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (providing 
basis for manufacturer liability); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 377, 377 P.2d 897, 
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (\962) (same). 
50. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 36, at 6-10 (discussing legislative responses to malpractice 
issues). 
51. See generally WEILER ET AL., supra note 36. 
52. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 36, at 29 (noting certain conceptual and pragmatic difficulties 
resolved through jurisprudence). 
1084 SUFFOLK UNNERSI1Y LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVill: 1069 
ry tort law and policy from the courts. While appellate courts do indeed 
interpret specific provisions of the Accident Rehabilitation, Compensation 
and Insurance Act (ARCIA)53 and thus prescribe law and policy with 
respect to accident compensation, their involvement as prescribers of poli-
cy has generally been much more attenuated than in the American sys-
tem. In Japan/4 notwithstanding an active and liberal bar association, the 
prescribing function in regard to accidents and injuries, including toxic 
torts, seems to have been left to the vagaries of the Diet, the legislative 
branch. The Diet, with a few exceptions relating to highly publicized cases 
of toxic disasters, has until recently done little by way of prescribing 
beyond the traditional German-style civil code. Whether adoption of a new 
strict products liability law to conform with that of the European Commu-
nity will actually open access to claims by accident victims remains to be 
seen. 
2. The Intelligence Function 
Access by accident victims in the U.S. to the performance of the intelli-
gence function at the level of appellate courts, where they are engaging in 
prescribing law and policy, seems ample. Counsel are usually able, by 
Brandeis briefs or otherwise, to bring to the appellate panel information 
and data that is relevant to issues involving the making of law and policy. 
Perhaps a serious exception to this free access is being produced by mea-
sures taken or that may be taken, particularly in some federal circuits, to 
deal with an unmanageably heavy caseload of appellate cases.55 If the 
size or content of briefs is limited by the court or if oral argument is 
barred, then the effectiveness of the intelligence (as well as the promotion) 
function may be called into question. A fortiori, the performance of the 
intelligence function in aid of prescribing law and policy is totally cur-
tailed if non-frivolous appeals are denied to clean clogged dockets. 
The recent reform of the federal discovery rules also seems to be cur-
tailing the ability of accident victims to bring relevant information about a 
particular accident and its causes to courts engaged in applying existing 
53. These developments relate to situations of accidental harm that have been deleted from cover-
age by the accident compensation system and that, by virtue of the rule that injuries not covered by 
the Act are not withdrawn from the tort system, may show up as attempted lawsuits in the courts. 
They include, inter alia, actions to recover damages for emotional distress unrelated to sexual abuse or 
to physical injuries. See generally Rodney Harrison, Matters of Life and Deatlr-The Accident Rehabil· 
itation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 and Common Law Claims for Personal Injury, LEGAL 
REs. FOUND. PuB. No. 25 (1993). 
54. See Akio Morishima, The Japan Scene and the Present Product Liability Proposal, in Beyond 
Compensation, supra note 3, at 717-27 (tracing development of tort law in Japan and proposal for 
products liability legislation). 
55. See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Luncheon Address, in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTIlUI'E, RE-
MARKS AND ADDRESSES AT THE 71sT ANNuAL MEETING 16 (May 18, 1994). 
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law and policy. 56 The new rules could limit the ability of plaintiffs' coun-
sel to uncover facts that are necessary to support a plaintiff s case. 
In products liability design cases, similar effects may be achieved by 
rules of law that place the burden of proof on the accident victim to estab-
lish that there is a "reasonable alternative design" to the product that pro-
duced the harm.57 Such proof often involves highly technical information 
readily available to the designer and manufacturer, who presumably took 
such matters into account when designing the product, but not necessarily 
to the accident victim. Placing the burden of such proof on the victim, 
instead of requiring the defendant to prove that there is no reasonable 
alternative design, may weaken the plaintiff's ability to have existing 
substantive law applied to the facts of her case. 
Another barrier to the invoking of unpopular or novel, but deserving, 
claims may be the overzealous enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 11.58 
Generally speaking, liberal pre-trial discovery is not available in the 
courts of Japan, New Zealand, or England. Accident victims thus may not 
have the ability, on their own, to gather hard-to-fmd facts and data rele-
vant to the application of law at any hearing applying law to facts. Indeed 
in automobile accident cases in Japan, the principal source of facts in the 
"mediation" or "arbitration" proceedings, conducted at the insurance com-
pany-fmanced Traffic Accident Dispute Settlement Centers, is a detailed 
police report. 
Difficulties in securing discovery from other nations pose another possi-
ble problem of intelligence gathering for United States accident victims.59 
A plaintiff charging a Japanese automobile company with liability for 
product defects in a U.S. court, for example, may find that the company 
can thwart discovery of documents located in Japan. 
Performance of the intelligence function at the prescribing or terminat-
ing level in the legislative arena is a subject probably worthy of an entire 
book. While it is clear that the plaintiff's trial bar has had wide access and 
general success in presenting relevant information to decisionmakers in the 
U.S. House of Representatives and Senate and in many state legislatures, 
the effectiveness of such information may be overcome or weakened by 
56. See Paul R. Sugannan and Marc G. Perlin, Proposed Changes to Discovery Rules in Aid of 
"Tort Reform": Has the Case Been Made?, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1465, 1497-1500 (1993) (discussing 
difficulties injured consumer will experience in obtaining information under narrow discovery rules). 
57. See A.L.I., REsTATEMENT OF TIlE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUcrs LIABILITY, § 2, at 30 (Council 
Draft No.2, Sept. 2, 1994) (placing burden of proof on accident victim). 
58. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency'S Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 
25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341,361-71 (1990) (discussing amendment to Rule II). See also gener-
ally Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11,70 IND. LJ. 171 (1994). 
59. See generally Kurt Riechenberg, The Recognition of Foreign Privileges in United States Dis-
covery Proceedings, 9 J. lNTI.. L. Bus. 80 (1988). 
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media blitzes, often directed at voters and at principal decisionmakers, and 
by large campaign contributions fmanced by enormous campaign chests of 
powerful organizations opposed to the tort revolution.60 Of course, the 
plaintiffs' bar has also been accused of winning votes against tort reform 
with well-placed campaign contributions. 
3. The Promotion (Recommending) Function 
The U.S. legal system, as stated earlier, offers wide opportunities for 
representatives of accident victims engaged in litigation to press for favor-
able changes to law and policy at the appellate level. U.S. courts are, in 
general, notoriously open to policy arguments, and appeals are usually 
funded by law flrms, subject to a contingent fee, rather than impecunious 
accident victims. Not every tort plaintiff in every appeal, however, is 
represented by a lawyer who is up to the task. Because appellate decisions 
speak to the future, the right to recommend law and policy, for both plain-
tiffs and defendants, would be enhanced by permitting, perhaps even solic-
iting, amicus briefs from all groups with a legitimate interest in the issues 
in question. 
Promotion of pro-victim reforms and counterarguments to pro-defendant 
reforms are common in legislative arenas in the United States, by virtue of 
the existence of a relatively wealthy and well-organized plaintiffs' trial 
bar. The opportunity to engage in promotion of law and policy, however, 
should not be confused with achieving success in such promotion. The 
legislative and judicial trend to limit the rights of accident victims has not 
necessarily curtailed the right of accident victims to promote favorable law 
and policy.61 
By contrast, the right of accident victims individually or as a group to 
60. While the recent health refonn debate did not directly relate to accident law refonn, campaign 
spending and the electronic media blitz by the medical insurance industry clearly illustrates the ability 
of powerful special interests to undennine rational decision-making based upon excellent intelligence. 
Cf. Outrage of the Month: Health Care Reform: Biggest Lobbying Campaign Ever, 10 HEALTH LET-
TER 12 (Dr. Sydney M. Wolfe ed., Nov. 1994). Plaintiffs' tort lawyers may have effectively used 
similar strategies. 
61. It must be recognized that, to the extent that representatives of either victims or accident caus-
ers use their power effectively to promote or provide intelligence to mislead with regard to the prob-
lems and effects of tort, accident, and insurance law, the power of their opponents to promote rational 
decisional outcomes is diminished. The author believes that, while there are serious excesses built into 
the tort system and much hyperbole on the victims' side, the proponents of "tort refonn" have suc-
ceeded in grossly misleading the public and its decisionmakers about the nature and dimensions of the 
problems produced by tort law. One very important example is the view that medical malpractice 
actions significantly raise the cost of medical care, that there are too many such actions, and that there 
is, in consequence, an enonnous amount of needless "defensive medicine." Much of this has been 
discredited by one of the most important studies of medical malpractice ever undertaken. See generally 
Michael 1. Saks, Medical Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and Finding Real Solutions, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 693 (1994) (reviewing book by WEILER ET AL., supra note 36). 
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recommend law and policy to decisionmakers in courts or in the parlia-
ment in nations such as New Zealand, Great Britain, and, especially, Ja-
pan, seems much more limited. As with other decisional functions, the 
reasons relate to various barriers to legal representation or to the initiation 
of tort lawsuits. The appellate courts in New Zealand and England, as 
contrasted with those in the United States, seem to be more heavily prece-
dent-oriented, given to changing law only in "rare" situations.62 Further-
more, barristers in the English and New Zealand systems and bengoshi in 
the Japanese system do not usually specialize in the representation of 
victims (or defendants), but generally hold themselves out to represent 
either side in an accident suit. They do not therefore have the single-mind-
ed ardent (pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant) bias and zeal that often charac-
terize personal injury lawyers in the United States. 
Nevertheless, a very unusual phenomenon has developed in Japan, 
where victims of toxic torts, unable to bring class actions and generally 
frustrated from seeking damages against industrial tortfeasors in the courts, 
band together to sue the government for its failures in permitting toxic 
conditions to occur. Their purpose in these suits is solely to promote gov-
ernment policy-making designed to prevent further injuries and perhaps to 
create a mechanism for compensation when such injuries do occur.63 
In New Zealand, new opportunities seem to have arisen in the courts 
for promotion of law and policy favorable to accident victims, largely by 
reason of judges' negative reaction to the 1992 amendments to the acci-
dent compensation scheme that have significantly reduced accident com-
pensation, compared with both the prior Act and with common-law 
rights.64 
62. Cf. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 201 (1979) (evaluating utility of precedent). Devlin states: 
I have never felt the tyranny of precedent. It is a tie, certainly, but so is the rope that 
mountaineers use so that each gives strength and support to the others. The proper handling 
of precedent is part of judicial craftsmanship; the judge must learn how to use it and in 
particular how to identify the rare occasions when it is necessary to say that what judges 
have put together they can also put asunder. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
63. See generally Robert B. Leflar, Personal Injury Compensation Systems in Japan: Values Ad-
vanced and Values Undermined, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 3, at 744-51; Tsuneo 
Matsumoto, Brief Country Report: Japan, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 3, at 577-582; 
Shigeaki Tanaka, Justice, Accidents, and Compensation, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 3, at 
736-42. According to Leflar, [tlhe phenomenon ... whereby public-interest lawsuits are brought that 
make no financial sense, in which the costs of litigation could not possibly be recouped through the 
likely damage award, constitutes an important means for citizens to be heard." Leflar, supra note 3, at 
744. 
64. A much-mooted Master's decision in the High Court of Wellington adopted the view that 
"[rleduced availability and quantum of accident compensation may parallel the situation which oc-
curred early this century when Courts began to extend the concept of negligence to permit common 
law damages to be awarded because it became notorious that the statutory compensation available 
under the Worker'S Compensation Act was clearly inadequate." Akavi v. Taylor Preston Ltd., I 
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4. The Invoking Function 
The ability to invoke, or to set in motion, the common-law claim for 
tort damages is, as has already been suggested, heavily dependent upon 
the availability of counsel. Thus, the contingent fee and the absence of the 
threat of having to pay winner's legal fees are critical to the ability to 
invoke a claim except, perhaps, for the very wealthy and those who might 
qualify for free legal services. Because injury by the fault of another and 
inability to process a claim may cause serious injustice and frustration, the 
U.S. practice of allowing contingent fee contracts, coupled perhaps with 
recent ethics rules permitting law fIrms to waive the payment of costs by 
their losing clients, provides the broadest rights to invoke claims for tort 
victims. 
However, another factor that, as a practical matter, greatly inhibits the 
ability of seriously injured accident victims to invoke claims-or more 
accurately, seriously limits the utility of invocation-is the solvency of the 
defendant or, in the case of public entities, the partial or total immunity of 
the entity from suit. This problem is particularly acute in the case of auto-
mobile accidents. Only Alaska requires as much as $50,000 per person of 
liability insurance.6S Often individual drivers and owners are judgment 
proof and uninsured, even in compulsory insurance states, or significantly 
underinsured in serious accident cases. Further, even in a no-fault state, 
invoking the process of claim in a serious accident case is often ineffec-
tive to produce a decision for adequate compensation. Thus, only those 
relatively few seriously injured victims who are fortunate enough to have 
signifIcant self-protection-such as large amounts of un- and underinsured 
motorist insurance or accident and disability insurance-or who are in-
jured by the fault of a solvent or well-insured defendant, can hope to gain 
adequate compensation for themselves through the tort or no-fault process. 
Here, interestingly, victims' invoking power against wealthy and powerful 
defendants is great but is poor against poor or middle-class defendants, 
especially where only small amounts of liability insurance are available. 
Conversely, in automobile accident cases in Japan, victims who invoke 
the non-judicial process of accident compensation mentioned above rou-
tinely have access to high liability insurance limits: About $230,000 of 
N2.L.R. 33, 34-35 (1995). Similarly, the author has been informed that courts imposing penalties for 
violations of the Health and Safety in Employment Act of 1992, which provides fmes of up to NZ 
$100,000, have, in view of the inadequacy of accident compensation, awarded part of the fines to 
victims who have suffered injury by virtue of the violation even though no provision of the Act so 
provides. 
65. Chart, "Automobile Financial Responsibility/Compulsory Limits," Auto Insurance Database 
Report (Hawaii) (Dec. 1993). 
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liability insurance is required of all drivers and most carry unlimited liabil-
ity insurance.66 While the insurer-controlled process tends to produce 
much lower judgments than in the United States, recovery of a significant 
amount of the award is almost always assured.67 It should also be noted 
here that in most cases of serious injury, the invocation process is likely to 
produce a favorable outcome because, for all practical purposes, there is 
strict liability in Japan for automobile accidents.68 An interesting side 
effect, however, is that the auto insurance system pays for all automobile 
accidents, even those caused by product defects, and the auto insurers, at 
least until the recent adoption of strict products liability, have not sought 
contribution or indemnity from automobile manufacturers.69 As bringing 
a separate suit is too expensive for most injured victims, courts have not 
held auto manufacturers accountable for injuries caused by their defective 
products.7o 
On the other hand, personal injury victims of other forms of accidents 
in Japan, such as toxic torts, medical malpractice, or products liability 
injuries, may find themselves unable to invoke the tort process either 
because of lack of access to legal representation, as noted above, or, in the 
toxic tort situation (except where special legislation has created a right to 
administrative compensation for particular environmental hazards) because 
of the lack of any remedy.71 
66. See Morishima, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 55, at 719 (setting forth Japanese liabili-
ty insurance requirements). 
67. Morishima, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 55, at 719. "When a car is ... not covered 
by compulsory insurance or a car which injured the victim cannot be identified, a government fund 
pays compensation up to a certain amounL" See Morishima, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 55, 
at 719. 
68. See Matsumoto, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 64, at 579 (explaining Article III of 
Automobile Compensation Security Act). 
69. See Matsumoto, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 64, at 579 (discussing "quasi no-fault 
liability" in products liability scheme). 
70. The up-front anomey's fee in a $1,000,000 action is $45,000. Plaintiffs who succeed must pay 
a contingency fee in the same proportion. In addition, filing fees are very high and depend on the 
amount of the claim. The filing fee for a $1,000,000 action is $5,000. Matsumoto, in Beyond Compen-
sation, supra note 64, at 578. 
71. See Matsumoto, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 64, at 577-81 (discussing various tort 
actions). With regard to products liability, Professor Matsumoto has related an interesting comparison. 
Showa, a manufacturer of a nutritional substance containing an amino acid, L-Tryptophan, exported 
the substance to the United States and also sold it in Japan. Evidently, its L-Tryptophan was contami-
nated. Showa had paid $66,000,000 to settle more than 1000 law suits brought in the United States, as 
well as $100,000,000 in litigation and settlement costs, with much more to come. Matsumoto, in Be-
yond Compensation, supra note 64, at 580. The number of victims in Japan is not clear, but no cases 
have been reported other than that of one woman who was planning to bring an action, but had not 
done so at the time Professor Matsumoto wrote his commenL Matsumoto, in Beyond Compensation, 
supra note 64, at 580; see also Leflar, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 64, at 744-51 (discussing 
medical malpractice); Yutaka Tejima, Tort and Compensation in Japan: Medical M.alpractice and 
Adverse Effects from Pharmaceuticals, in Beyond Compensation, supra note 3, at 728-33 (discussing 
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The serious problem, in New Zealand, of invoking a process of claim 
against powerful injurers has been discussed.72 The victim may view this 
situation as a serious injustice.73 
5. The Applying Function 
Because it is normally a court, an arbitrator, an administrative agency, 
or a private organization that performs the function of applying law and 
policy to a particular claim of injury, the above discussion of the intel-
ligence, promotion, and invoking functions are more relevant to the ques-
tion of whether accident victims are empowered in relation to their claims 
for compensation or justice. 
One feature of the application system in the United States-the avail-
ability of an independent judge, jury, or arbitrator-<leserves special recog-
nition.74 Compared with systems such as New Zealand's, where accident 
compensation decisions may be made by nonexpert and sometimes non-
friendly examiners,7S or Japan's, where the applying function in auto-
mobile accident cases is usually performed by lawyers and former judges 
paid by liability insurers in a forum provided by the insurers,76 the ability 
easily to invoke a bench or jury trial in the United States constitutes a 
much more formidable and potentially effective kind of power for victims 
of alleged tortious misconduct. 
6. The Appraising Function 
The function of examining law and policy and its operation to deter-
mine whether and to what extent preferred policy goals are being achieved 
is more open to victims of tort in systems such as the United States, where 
there is a large, wealthy bar specialized in advocating the rights of such 
victims. Such an organized bar may conduct its own appraisals and pub-
lish relevant findings in its own organs, which have wide circulation to 
medical malpractice involving use and side-effects of drugs). 
72. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings of New Zealand tort 
system). 
73. David Sargeant, CEO of the Insurance Council of New Zealand, Inc., related the following 
story to the author. After Sargeant first arrived from Australia to take up a position in New Zealand, 
he and his wife were carrying a newly purchased bed into their home. His wife stepped on a metal 
grill in the street that collapsed under her, causing her to fall several feet and suffer very serious inju-
ries. He then learned, with some horror, that while his wife was entitled to limited compensation from 
the Accident Compensation Corporation, the municipality, which controlled the grill and the road, had 
no legal responsibility whatsoever to his wife or to him for her injuries. 
74. There is no right to a jury trial in personal injury actions in England. Judges and arbitrators 
may be independent, but except for those who are rich or who qualify for legal aid, the other cost 
hurdles to bringing an action are formidable. 
75. See generally Trapski, supra note 45. 
76. See Miller, supra note 24, at 211-12 (explaining procedures for accident disputes in Japan). 
1994] TORT LA W AND POWER 1091 
their membership. It may recommend particular outcomes of appraisal 
during appellate review or at legislative hearings. Similarly, but often in 
opposition to the plaintiffs' bar, organizations favorably disposed to defen-
dants, such as the Defense Research Institute, also actively pursue the 
appraisal function. An organization made up of lawyers and scholars 
drawn from a less specialized, but nevertheless elite, segment of the bar, 
the American Law Institute, also engages in appraisal and recommendation 
in order to temper, and sometimes thwart, appraisal and recommendation 
efforts of the plaintiffs' and defendants' bars. Because of the prestige in 
which the organization is held by appellate judges, the A.L.I.'s recommen-
dations, set forth in its Restatements of the Law, may succeed in con-
straining the effectiveness of the more partisan groups. The A.L.I.' s ap-
praisal function in major tort law issues, such as products liability, seems 
to emphasize precedent more now than it has in the past, when the Insti-
tute led the development of new rights to recovery. 77 
Appraisal may be performed effectively in other nations by ftrst-rate 
law commissions, as in New Zealand78 and England,79 or by interested 
scholars in law journals, as is the case in England, Japan, New Zealand, 
and the United States. Perhaps missing in nations with no strong, partisan 
plaintiffs' tort bar is a strong adversarial view of appraisal widely avail-
able for presentation in appellate proceedings or legislative hearings. On 
the other hand, what is missing in the United States, perhaps, is the ap-
praisal of powerful interests representing tort victims, on the one hand, 
and insurers, on the other, which widens the policy choices to include 
non-tort alternatives such as no-fault schemes. Lawyers for both sides tend 
to be wedded to the tort system. The broader view in the United States 
thus seems to be taken mostly by legal scholars.so Alternatively, in New 
Zealand, although employers81 and trade union representatives82 engage 
77. Compare REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) with REsTATEMENT OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Council Draft No.2, 1994). 
78. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
IN NEW ZEALAND (1967) (original report, known as "Woodhouse Report," giving rise to adoption of 
no-fault accident compensation scheme); LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No.4, PERSONAL INJURY: PRE-
VENTION AND REcOVERy-REpoRT ON THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SYSTEM (1988) [hereinafter 
REPORT No.4] (functioning as "follow-up" to Woodhouse Report). 
79. I ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 
REPORT (1978). 
80. Two such commentators are Jeffrey O'Connell, the foremost proponent of no-fault substitutes 
for or complements to the tort system, and Stephen D. Sugarman, who advocates doing away with the 
tort system and replacing it with other compensation and regulatory mechanisms. 
81. See REPORT No.4, supra note 78, at 212-37 (providing extensive list of persons and orga-
nizations contributing to New Zealand's accident compensation scheme). 
82. See Harel Armstrong, Union Viewpoint on ACC: Rescuing the Woodhouse Vision and Re-
claiming Our Compensation Rights, Speech to the COAC Conference (Aug. 24, 1994) (copy in 
author's possession). 
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in extensive and adversarial discourse involving appraisal of developments 
in the field of no-fault accident compensation, there are few lawyers or 
others who have advocated a return to the tort liability system. 
7. The Termination Function 
With regard to the arenas in which actual decisions to terminate exist-
ing law and policy are made, victims of tortious personal injury in the 
United States have considerable access and ability, largely through their 
legal representatives, to provide information favoring their cause and to 
recommend adoption or rejection of particular proposals. There is little 
difference here between the prescribing and terminating functions. 
Using California as an example, however, it is also clear that the public 
may possess considerable countervailing power through initiative, the 
power to elect judges, and the general right to vote for its representatives. 
From the point of view of preferred goals, there is every reason to be 
pleased that the power of the ordinary citizen may also run to issues in-
volving the development and termination of tort law policies. The public, 
after all, is comprised of those who have already or someday may become 
victims of tortious accidents, and to have power is not the same as win-
ning all decisions. If there exists a problem that undermines the goal of 
extending power to accident victims, then it is again in the ability of pow-
erful private interests to defeat the intelligence process and sound deci-
sion-making by using modern media strategies that permit wide distortion, 
oversimplification, and appeals to emotion. The complexity of tort and 
related insurance law thereby seems to defeat wise exercise of decisional 
power by the public at large. 
V. APPRAISAL 
The authors of the A.L.I.' s Reporters' Study, Enterprise Responsibility 
for Personal Injury, have downgraded the importance of decisional power 
of accident victims.83 First, they recognize that "large corporate enterpris-
es are the real defendants in most high-stakes tort litigation," and that 
"UJuries and judges see large organizations abusing their power through 
systematic endangerment of large segments of the population."84 Further-
more, they admit that "skepticism proliferates about the willingness of the 
executive branches of government to control abuses of corporate power, in 
part because of a perceived symbiotic relationship between the private and 
public bureaucracies."85 They also admit that "there is something satisfy-
83. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 26-27. 
84. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 26. 
85. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 26. 
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ing about a process that allows ordinary people to put 'authority in the 
dock'86 and hold it to account for such human tragedies as asbestos expo-
sure, DES, or the fallout from nuclear testing.,,87 
Nevertheless, the authors denigrate the goal of empowering the private 
citizen vis a vis powerful corporations and government.88 They argue that 
the individuals in the powerful entities that caused the injuries are usually 
long gone by the time the injuries occur and the corporate or governmen-
tal entity is called to account. 89 They assert, therefore, that damages are 
not imposed on those who originally created the excessive risk but on 
present-day shareholders, employees, and customers of the fIrm, most of 
whom are not responsible for the original misconduct.90 
The problem with their argument, however, is that in much products 
liability litigation there is not necessarily such a "great distance between 
those whose actions trigger the suit and those who must eventually pay the 
bill.,,91 While the time lag may be enormous in asbestos litigation, and 
where serious illness does not appear until many years after initial expo-
sure, such as in some matters involving drugs, such as DES,92 there are 
many cases involving unsafe products in which the imposition of liability 
follows reasonably quickly after the accident.93 Delays in those cases are 
often a product of the defendant's litigation tactics. 
Whether or not there is a long delay in establishing accountability, 
however, it hardly lies in the mouths of corporate shareholders, who are 
insulated from personal responsibility by the corporate veil, to complain 
that accountability has remained with the corporate entity. OffIcers and 
employees are, in almost all cases, similarly protected from personal civil 
liability by the corporation itself. Additionally, it is not necessarily true, as 
the Reporters' Study suggests, that customers end up paying a good part 
of the bill. Instead, the forces of competition will in most cases provide an 
86. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 26 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Authority in 
the Dock, 69 B.U. L. REv. 469 (1989». 
87. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 26. 
88. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 26. 
89. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 26. 
90. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 26. 
91. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 26. 
92. See generally Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. III. 1978) (involving 
medical experiment with DES). 
93. These tend to be accident cases where defects in recently manufactured products cause acci-
dents involving serious injury. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757,174 Cal. Rptr. 
348 (1981) (May 28, 1972 accident involving 1972 Ford Pinto purchased in November 1971). Final 
appeal of the Grimshaw case was decided less than 10 years from the date of purchase. See generally 
id. In Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., a 1966 Isuzu rental car ran off the road and injured plain-
tiff on Feb. 20, 1966. Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 71, 470 P.2d 240, 241 (1970). 
The Hawaii Supreme Court affmned judgment in favor of plaintiff on May 26, 1970. Id. at 79, 470 
P.2d at 245. The Stewart case is Hawaii's leading case on products liability. 
1094 SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo!. xxvrn:l069 
advantage in the marketplace to the ftnns and actors who did not engage 
in misconduct. Customers can vote with their feet to patronize safer pro-
ducers. Furthennore, intelligent investors will surely inquire into the histo-
ry of companies in which they invest to determine whether unwise or 
outrageous safety decisions in the past might result in lawsuits that could 
produce adverse economic effects for the ftnn and reduce the value of 
their investments. Assuming the rationality of decision-making in the 
corporate sphere, the accountability that liability produces is likely to lead 
to more safety-conscious decisions in the future. For all of these reasons, 
it is inappropriate to suggest, as do the authors of the Reporters' Study, 
that the costs of litigation will not "prove to be a socially worthwhile 
investment ... for ameliorating the personal injury problem.'>94 
Furnishing decisional power to accident victims does not merely pennit 
them to counter corporate abuses of power but gives them a voice in deci-
sions that affect their values, with regard to both accidental injuries al-
ready sustained and future accidents that may be deterred. This voice is 
important irrespective of the existence of adversaries who are in a strong 
power position. On the whole our current system appears to provide such 
a voice. 
By contrast, victims of accidents in nations such as New Zealand, Ja-
pan, and England, where legal representation in tort forums is not assured, 
are virtually powerless with respect to their ability to hold accident causers 
accountable in any signiftcant decisional arena. This powerlessness neces-
sarily translates into adverse effects, such as inadequate compensation for 
injuries; feelings of helplessness, frustration, depression, anger and cyni-
cism; weak deterrence and excessive nuinbers and severity of accidents; 
and, in general, development of accident law and policy that does not 
adequately reflect the interests of accident victims. 
Unfortunately, the United States system, while furnishing considerable 
power to many victims, also leaves many gaps in liability that may trans-
late into similar adverse effects. These gaps are largely a result of idiosyn-
cracies caused by the economics and realities of law practice that result in 
a failure or inadequacy of representation for various important groups. 
These groups include victims of accidents with no provable tort claim or 
whose tort claim has been rejected;95 victims of accidents involving tort 
claims where defendant's resources-assets or insurance-fall far short of 
plaintiff's damages; victims of medical malpractice and other torts, whose 
damages, though considerable, fall below a high profttability threshold for 
94. ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 27. 
95. This category would include victims of serious injuries whose injuries were caused by an 
immune or partly immune public entity. It would also include an important category of cases involving 
pollution and toxic torts, where problems of proving causation tend to undermine a tort law solution. 
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contingent-fee attorneys; poor accident victims who, by virtue of their 
poverty, are unaware of their lega1 rights or reluctant to assert them; vic-
tims whose poor fmancia1 situation, coupled with court delays, coerces 
them to accept inadequate compensation; and victims of torts committed 
by actors, such as cigarette companies, who are wealthy and powerful 
enough to make representation of plaintiffs under a contingent fee unprof-
itable.96 
These situations represent cases where the victim is left without com-
pensation through the tort system and possibly any other system. In many 
of these cases, the absence of adequate health care systems and adequate 
systems for rep]acing economic losses caused by disability represents a 
larger societal problem in the United States. New avenues to power on 
beha1f of these victims are clearly needed. Arguably, the persona1 injury 
bar should take up their cause for at least two reasons. First, adequate 
basic compensation by way of medica1 care and disability income replace-
ment will enable otherwise impecunious victims to pursue their tort claims 
even in the face of court delay. Second, it will counter a major criticism 
of the tort system, that it overlooks and diverts attention from a much 
more serious societa1 problem.97 
Only the last two situations described above, however, are those in 
which the excessive wea1th and power of an injury causer leave the victim 
remediless or without an adequate remedy. Even in those situations, how-
ever, the plaintiffs' bar remains available, and should no doubt be very 
willing and eager, to exercise its considerable power to promote suitable 
remedies by way of compensation and deterrence to prescribing and termi-
nating authorities. 
Potentia1 problem areas include possible curtailment of discovery oppor-
tunities,98 limitations on appeals designed to deal with crowded appellate 
dockets, inhibiting the presentment of novel claims or civil rights claims 
because of improper use of Rule II-style sanctions, and, of course, adop-
tion of "loser pays." These problems could in tum adversely affect partici-
pation by representatives of accident victims in important decision-making 
arenas. On the other hand, to the extent that rules such as these, except for 
"loser pays," make litigation more efficient and reduce its costs (especia11y 
96. It is interesting to note that without exception, the basic, or minimal, compensation needs of 
each of these groups could be provided by a no-fault compensation system encompassing medical ex-
penses and income replacement. Perhaps the personal injury bar should consider whether it is not in its 
interest, if not its professional responsibility, to advocate for basic compensation for these groups. The 
payers of such compensation, of course, could be reimbursed from any tort recoveries. 
97. See Comments of Geoffrey Palmer, in Comment: Sugarman's Proposals for Reform, in Be-
yond Compensation, supra note 3, at 697-98 (questioning priorities in America). 
98. Cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery 
Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (1994) (describing 
abuse of discovery and shortcomings of civil justice reform in America). 
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in cases in which damage claims are not large) they might weaken the 
ability of wealthy defendants to bury victims' claims in heavy costs. As 
for "loser pays," once the ability to commence a lawsuit is lost, access to 
all the other functions of decisional power provided by the tort system will 
be curtailed. 
On the basis of this preliminary survey, it does not appear that tort law 
places excessive power in the hands of tort victims. Notwithstanding the 
considerable power of the personal injury bar, policies and rules that have 
been argued to cause overdeterrence and to inhibit important and useful 
activities, such as strict design defect liability for pharmaceuticals, are 
being overturned in favor of less stringent rules, such as those based on 
proof of negligence.99 Assuming that there has been overdeterrence, its 
cause was not only the power of the plaintiffs' bar, but also the persua-
siveness at the time of the reasoning in favor of the allegedly 
overdeterring rules. 
Finally, it does appear, notwithstanding the problems that have been 
identified, that the personal injury tort system in the United States does 
serve as an effective tool for optimizing the power of victims of tortious 
accidents against wealthy and powerful actors who cause such accidents. 
This is in sharp contrast with the situations in England, Japan, and New 
Zealand. There exist some deficiencies regarding power directed to secur-
ing compensation, the most serious of which is the lack of adequate re-
sources to compensate seriously injured victims. At first glance, the stated 
goal of providing access to the arenas of law and policy-making is being 
achieved. 
Whether and to what extent there are other instrumentalities, in nations 
such as England, Japan, and New Zealand, that are effective in balancing 
the power of wealthy actors in a position to cause injuries-such as prod-
uct manufacturers, polluters, slumlords, health care providers, or their 
insurers-is beyond the scope of this essay. Whether there are such mech-
anisms, and whether they are effective, does not leap out of the 
literature. 1oo There exist important regulatory bodies in the United States, 
such as OSHA and the Consumer Product Safety Commission, that sup-
plement the tort system in encouraging safety-conscious decisions. The ef-
fectiveness of these bodies often depends on the enthusiasm of the admin-
istration in power, which is not encouraging from the perspective of coun-
99. See Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d. 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988) 
(limiting liability of manufacturers of prescription drugs). See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Begin-
ning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601 (1992). 
100. But see Japan Drug-maker Punished After 15 Die, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Sept. I, 1994, 
at AlO (describing punitive measures of one government). In that situation, U[t]he government ordered 
a pharmaceutical company . . . to halt production for 3 112 months as punishment for withholding 
information about a medicine blamed for IS deaths last fall." Id. 
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tervailing power. Thus, with regard to providing effective power to acci-
dent victims, the American system of tort liability appears, at ftrst glance, 
to be the most effective source of countervailing power, not unsuitable in 
a nation that takes prides itself giving the individual citizen a voice in her 
or his destiny.lOI For this, Tom Lambert, to whom this issue is dedicated, 
surely deserves a lion's share of the credit. 
101. See generally Robert Reno, Juries Sometimes Err, Bless 'em, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Sept. 
2, 1994, at A16. Reno noted: "Anyway Liebeck [the woman who was scalded between the legs by a 
65 cent cup of McDonald's coffee] mayor may not have suffered $2.9 million worth of damages and 
pain, but she is, for all of us, living, breathing and now rich reaffirmation that the legal system, maybe 
not always but occasionally, and with majestic eccentricity, comes down on the side of the 
unempowered." [d. 
